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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CRYSTAL LIME AND CEMENT
COMPANY, a corporation
Paintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No.
8948

GOLDEN W. ROBBINS and HARRIET J. ROBBINS, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was originally tried to quiet title in favor
of the appellant and plaintiff and against the respondents and defendants in and to a tract of land situate
on the foothills in the Northeast part of Salt Lake City.
The partcular tract of land involved had originally been
mining property and because of this, a question has
arisen regarding the manner of assessment of the property for general taxes. The Supreme Court of the State
of Utah on September 16, 1949, handed down its Derision affirming the trial court's Judgment quieting title
in the plaintiffs, but reversing that part of the decision
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denying reimbursement of taxes. The Supreme Court's
decision, in determining the manner in which the defendants should be reimbursed for the payment of their
taxes, stated:
"We hold, therefore, that the plaintiff should
be required to reimburse the defendants for the
amount expended by them in purchasing their
tax title to the 145 acres from the county, exclusive of any premium the defendants might have
paid, but only up to that amount which would
have been due had the property been properly
assessed by the Tax Commission during those
years. Because it may be some tune before the
State Tax Commission makes an assessment for
those years it omitted to do so, if it ever makes
an assessment at all, the lower court should
fashion the relief granted to the parties to meet
this exigency. It would work an injustice on the
plaintiff to delay entering a decree quieting title
in it until the Tax Commission acts. The lower
court, could for instance, require the plaintiff to
reimburse the defendants for the mnount paid
by them and if there were any likelihood that the
assessment for those back years, if and when
made by the Tax Cmnmission, would be substantially less than that 1nade by the county assessor,
exact fron1 defendants assurance that the defendants would repay to the plaintiff the difference."
Thereafter, on June 5, 1950, the appellant filed a
Notice of Application for Judg1nent in Accordance with
Mandate of the Supren1e Court in order to cmnply with
the Supre1ne Court Decision concerning the reimbursernent of the defendants for taxes covering the property
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(R. 9). Thereafter, on June 8, 1950, the Respondents
obtained a continuance of the hearing to Saturday, J nne
17, 1950 (R. 10).
On J nne 19, 1950, the Court heard the Motion of
the Appellant at which it atte1npted to introduce evidence to establish the value which the State Tax Con1Inisson might put on the property (R. 13). The ev]dence
was rejected and argument was 1nade by each party,
attempting to establish the proper amount to be reimbursed to the respondents. The appellant offered in court
to reimburse the respondents in the amount of $235.7 4,
the amount Respondents claimed had been paid for the
property (R. 13). After considerable argument, the court
recessed. No written Findings or Judgment were entered
in the case, but a Minute Entry was shown to have been
entered on June 19, as follows:
"The Court finds the issues in favor of the deft.
and against the pltf. and the matter is dismissed/'
Thereafter, the appellant against attempted to take
some steps to obtain relief and filing a Notice of Motion
to Dis1niss Action on August 8, 1953. After argument and
the apparent introduction of evidence, the Court again
made nothing more than a Minute Entry, wherein it
denied the appellant's Motion to Dismiss (R. 22).
Again on 11ay 22, 1958, the appellant attempted to
obtain relief by filing a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Prosecution and Motion for Decree Quieting Title Pursuant to Opinion of Supreme Court. After argument,
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said Motion was denied by a Minute Entry and no written
Findings or Judgment were entered (R. 24, 25).
Thereafter, on July 21, 1958, the respondent filed
a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (R. 26), and on July
:25, 1958, appellant filed a Motion to Enter Order in
Accordance with Mandate or for Entry of Written
Judgment (R. 28, 29). Appellant also filed Plaintiff's
Answer to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice
( R. 30). Respondent on July 28, 1958, filed a X otice of
Hearing and Appellant on July :29, 1958, likewise filed a
Notice of Hearing. After the matter was fully argued,
the court entered its Order and Judgment of Dismissal
with Prejudice (R. 42), and from that Order and Judgment, the appellant takes this appeal.
STATE~IEXT

OF POINTS

POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDI·CE AND IN ADJUDGING
THAT PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AND COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(a)

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ISSUES OF THE CASE HAVE BEEN DENIED
UPON THE MERITS BY THE COURT IN FAVOR
OF THE DEFENDANTS.

(b)

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CASE HAS NOT BEEN PROSECUTED WITH DILIGENCE AND HAS THUS RESULTED IN PREJUDI·CE TO THE DEFENDANTS
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POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION THAT THE COURT HEAR EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DIRECTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT AND ENTER ITS WRITTEN
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH, DETERMINING
THE REMAINING ISSUES AND THE AMOUNT DUE TO
DEFENDANTS.
POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HEAR ARGUMENTS AND TO ENTER ITS WRITTEN FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DE.CREE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE WRITTEN MINUTE ENTRY HERETOFORE ENTERED BY JUDGE CLARENCE E. BAKER ON
JUNE 19, 1950.
POINT IV.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION THAT THE COURT ENTER WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DE.CREE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MINUTE ENTRY
OF JUDGE STEWART M. HANSEN HERETOFORE
ENTERED ON JUNE 2, 1958.
POINT V.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENTER AN
ORDER OR JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDI·CE AND IN ADJUDGING
THAT PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AND COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice and therein listed five (5) grounds for said Motion,
which are shown at Page 26 of the Record. These five
grounds can be combined into two grounds and summed
up as follows: (a) That the issues of the case have heretofore been denied upon the merits by the court in favor
of the defendants; and, (b) that the plaintiff, in failing
to comply with the order of the court, has also fa~led
to prosecute the case with diligence, resulting in prejudice
to the said defendants.
(a)

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ISSUES OF THE CASE HAVE BEEN DENIED
UPON THE MERITS BY THE COURT IN FAVOR
OF THE DEFENDANTS.

The only issues decided by the Court in this case were
those tried in the Lower Court and affirmed by the
opinion of the Supreme Court (R. 2-7). Subsequent to
the entry of this Suprmne Court decision, there has been
no adjudication of the rights of the parties nor has there
been any decision by the Court on the 1nerits in favor
of either party. The Respondent, in 1naking such an argument, 1nust be referring to the :Minute Entry. dated
June 19, 1950, as a final judgment.
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This Minute Entry resulted from the Appellant's
attempt to comply with the mandate of the Supreme
Court decision. Appellant filed a Motion entitled "Notice
of Application for Judgment in Accordance with Mandate
of the Supreme Court". This Motion was called on for
hearing before Judge Baker on said date. At this hearing,
the plaintiff's (Appellant's) attorney attempted to introduce evidence showing the assessed valuation of the
property under an assessment made by the Utah State
Tax Commission. This evidence was not admitted by the
Court and so in a further attempt to obtain relief under
the Supreme Court Decision, the Appellant offered to
reimburse the Respondents for the amount paid for the
Tax Deed, to-wit, $236.00 (R. 17). This offer was based
upon the Appellant's interpretation of the Supreme Court
Decision, the applicable paragraph of which is cited
above. The offer was refused by the Respondents and
further argument in the hearing ensued (R. 17-19). The
Court recessed and there appeared in the Docket Book
the following Minute Entry:
"Entered Order: The Ct. finds the issues in favor
of the Deft. and against the Pltf. and the matter
is dismissed."
This Minute Entry ended the proceedings so far as said
hearing was concerned and no formal Judgment or
Findings were ever entered.
Thus the Respondent, in his Motion, which also must
be taken to be the grounds for denial of Appellant's
Motion, can not correctly argue that the Trial Court
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1nade any determination of the matters on their merits.
There simply was no Judgment entered.
vVithout a final Judgment duly entered in the case,
there is no final decision of the Court and the matter is
still pending awaiting a determination of the amounts
to be reimbursed. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that a :Minute Entry such as we have in this case, is not
a final Judgment. Until such a final Judgment is entered,
the Trial Court has made no final decision of the matters
before it.
In the case of Robison vs. Fillmore Commercial &
Savings Bank, 61 Utah 398, 213 Pac. 790, the Supreme
Court, in dismissing the appeal, stated:
"it appears from the Minute Orders of the lower
court that ..... counsel for plaintiff in open court
states that the plaintiff stands on its Complaint
as filed herein. The court then enters its Order
dismissing said Complaint. The Xotice of Appeal
is taken from the Judgment dismissing plaintiff's
Complaint. No Judgment further than these :Jlinute Entries is shown to have been 1nade or entered
by the court. Upon authority of the opinion of
this court in Lukisch v. lTtah Construction Co.,
46 Utah 317, 150 Pac. 298, these :Jiinute En trieR
do not constitute an~- Judg1nent of the court dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action . .:\n appeal
is allowed only fr01n final judg1nent. .... ''
Again our Court stated in Omega Inrestment C01npany vs. 1Voo1ey, 75 lTtah ~74, ~S-! Pac. 523, that:
"There nm8t be a final judg1nent entered. A
judg1nent is a final deter1nination of the rights
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of the parties. Lukisch vs. Utah Construction
Company, 46 Utah, 317, 150 Pac. 298 . . . . . In
connection with this point, it is to be noted that
the present transcript does not contain any 'copy
of judgment' . . . . . in the Judgment Roll which
purports to have been made upon the order of
the court of January 5, 1929..... This court has
previously held that there must appear from the
record that there was a judgment entered upon
the order evidenced in the minute entry. The minute entry is not sufficient (citing cases)."
For other cases, please see Stubbs v. Third Judicial
Di·strict, 106 Utah 539, 150 P. 2d 783, and Williams 'V.
Tuckett, 98 Utah 398, 95 P. 2d 982.
Thus it cannot be maintained that the Trial Court
has at any time subsequent to the entry of the Supreme
Court Decision, made any determination of the rights of
the parties which is a final adjudication thereof. It is
this very deficiency which the plaintiff has attempted
to remedy by filing its Motion for Entry of Written
Judgment (R. 28). The Lower Court, however, in now
upholding Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, has actually
determined that the prior Minute Entry of the Lower
Court constitutes a final judgment on the merits. This,
of course, cannot be the case either as a matter of fact
or under the law cited above. There has not been a final
adjudication of the parties' rights.
Since there is no final decision, Appellants should
be allowed to have the matters reviewed either by hearing
pursuant to the mandate of the Court or by an appeal
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from the judgment of the Trial Court handed down in
carrying out this mandate. By its present dismissal, the
Court has prevented the plaintiff from having either
procedure. Let us discuss first the hearing required by
the mandate.
The Supreme Court, in its decision, affirmed the
Lower Court judgment quieting title in the plaintiff and
then went on to order the Trial Court to determine the
amount of taxes to be reimbursed to the defendant. This
Court said:
"We hold, therefore, that the plaintiff should
be required to reimburse the defendants for the
amount expended by them in purchasing their
tax title..... Because it may be some time before
the State Tax Commission makes an assessment
for those years it ommitted to do so, if it ever
makes an assessment at all, the lower court should
fashion the relief granted to the parties to meet
this exigency ..... "
The Trial Court was thus ordered to determine the
amount due and in refusing to make this determination,
has deprived the plaintiff of the right to have the taxes
determined and to have the proceeding terminated.
Appellant attmnpted to comply with the 1nandate
by calling on for hearing its Notice of Application for
Judgment in Accordance with Mandate of the Supreme
Court. Evidence and argunwnt submitted by the Appellant gave it no relief and the 1natter was dismissed.
Thereafter, in 1953, Appellant again attempted unsuccessfully to obtain relief by asking for a disnrissal of the
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proceeding in order to obtain relief by a new action. This
was necessary inasmuch as the Court, under Judge Baker,
had already ruled against Plaintiff, thus precluding the
seeking of further relief of the same nature before another Judge.
The Court in both cases, has prevented the plaintiff
from obtaining the relief ordered by the Supreme Court
Decision and in so doing, has not complied with the
Supreme Court Decision. It is well accepted that the
Trial Court must comply with the mandate of the
Suprerne Court. Leach 'V. Manhart, 113 P. 2d 1002;
DaRouch v. District Court of Third Jttdicial District, 70
P. :2d 1006, 95 Utah 227, 116 A.L.R. 1147.
A further question arises as to the effect of the
rrrial Court's dismissal with prejudice, from which this
appeal is taken. This judgment seeks to operate retroactively by dismissing not only the proceedings relating
to the determination of the tax, but also the complete
cause of action (R. 42). This order thus reverses the
Supreme Court's affirmance of the judgment quieting
title in the plaintiff and results in the divesture of plaintiff's land. It is well established that the Lower Court
cannot, unless so directed by the Supreme Court decision,
reverse the original Trial Court's decision, nor reverse
the affirmance of said decision by the Supreme Court.
The Court, in dismissing the Complaint, has gone
beyond any power it may have to dismiss this action.
The Lower Court now must be confined to the issues
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re1nanded to it by the Supreme Court decision and those
Issues only involve the determination of the amount of
taxes.
The Trial Court, upon remand, only has jurisdiction
over the particular matters directed to its attention by
the Supreme Court Decision. As is stated in Street 1~··
Fottrth Judicial Dvstrct Court, 191 P. 2d 153, 113 rtah
60:
"The principles boil down to this fundamental
propostion as to all matters adjudicated by the
Appellate Court, both the Trial Court and the
parties are foreclosed from further trying those
matters. They become the law of the case. But
as to matters left open by the Appellate Court,
it is within the sound discretion of the Trial Court
to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as
to those matters."
Again, as is stated in Glenn rs. Chambers, 56 X.",Y.
2d 892, where the Court quotes and follows Ronna rs.
American State Bank, 246 N.,V. 798 (Iowa):
"When the opinion of tllis Court indicates that
the cause is reversed and re1nanded for a special
purpose, the District Court upon the remand is
limited to do the special thing authorized by this
Court in its opinion, and nothing else.''
The Court also cites 3 An1. J ur. 730, Appeal and Error.
Sec. 12:~-t: and 5 (b) C.J.S., Sec. 1960 et seq.
A case very nearly in point to the present one is
Thomas vs. Durschla!J, 102 N.E. 2d 11-t Here the plaintiff sued to quiet title by re1noving a tax deed cloud on
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the title held by defendant. The Trial Court decided in
plaintiff's favor, but failed to reimburse the defendant
for taxes paid. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court affir1ned
the Lower Court's decision relating to the title question,
but reversed the Lower Court's decision relating to the
rei1nbursement of the taxes and remanded the case. The
Court said:
"Clearly the Findings of Fact made by the
Chancellor are true and not against the manifest
weight of the evidence. In all respects the Decree
is confirmed, except for the erroneous failure of
the Chancellor to decree reimbursement of Durchslag, by Thomas, for all the taxes, interest and
costs properly paid out by the former, and except
for the erroneous assessment of the costs against
Durchslag. As to these matters, the Decree of the
Superior Court of Cook County is reversed and
remanded with the direction to enter a Decree
which conforms with this opinion."
The mandate of the Court stated:
"Therefore, it is considered that * * * this
cause be remanded * * * * * with direction to enter
a Decree which conforms with the opinion attached
to this mandate."
Upon remand, plaintiff atte1npted to contest the
defendant's right to reimbursement, but the Trial Court
proceeded to hear evidence upon the assumption that
nothing remained to be done except as was relative to
the taxes paid. The Supreme Court, in affirming the
Trial Court's strict adherance to the mandate, stated:
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"Where a judgment is reversed by an Appellate
Court, the judgment of that court is final upon
all questions decided and those questions are no
longer open to consideration. The Court to which
a cause is remanded can take only such proceedings as conform to the judgment of the Appellate
Tribunal * * * * * where as here the directions
of a reviewing court are specific, a positive duty
devolves upon the Court to which the cause is
remanded to enter an Order or Decree in accordance with the directions quoted in the mandate.
*** The order of this Court upon the prior appeal
is not ambiguous. The cause was remanded for but
a single purpose and specific directions were
given. The Chancellor, upon remand of the cause~
lacked discretion concerning the granting of relief to defendant in the respects described 1n
(the prior decision)."
Also see Flanigan t·s. McFeely, 120 At. 2d 102.
Therefore, it would seem that although the Order
of Dismissal refers to a complete dis1nissal of the action,
it can and should only actually affect the proceedings
relating to the determination of the a1nount of taxes due
the defendant. All other questions have been decided and
are not open to this Court's detennination.
With reference to the appeal to which Appellant
should be entitled, it is readily apparent that such an
appeal has been denied by this judgment of the Lower
Court. When the Lower Court denied the plaintiff and
the defendant the right to a detern1ination of the taxe~
to be reiinbursed, neither part~· took any steps to 1nake tlw
order of the Court a final appealable order. although
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both had this opportunity. Inasmuch as Judge Baker~s
Order of Dismissal was in favor of the defendant, it
would seem that said defendant should have been the
proper party to make the final appealable order. Defendant did not take this step. Neither did defendant have
entered a final appealable order after the dismissal by
Judge Jeppson, occurring in 1953.
The plaintiff attempted to obtain an appealable order
by its :\lotion filed July 25, 1958. However, this Motion
was denied by the Lower Court's last judgment and
left only as an appealable Inatter the propriety of the
denial of the Motion. Thus plaintiff has been effectively
prevented frmn either a. proper hearing pursuant to the
mandate of the Court, or an appeal from a judgment
relating to this hearing on the mandate.
(b)

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CASE HAS NOT BEEN PROSECUTED WITH DILIGENCE AND HAS THUS RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANTS

It is recognized, of course, that a dismissal for want
of prosecution will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Cameron vs.
Cameron, 252 P. 2d 408. However, in this case, in view
of the record before the Court, Appellant maintains
that there has been a clear abuse of discretion and also
that the situation here involved is not a proper one involving want of prosecution.
A list of the steps taken by the plaintiff, commencing
with the first Motion in 1950 and continuing through

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
the Motion to Dismiss in 1953 and the subsequent Motions
in 1958, do not indicate a lack of prosecution, particularly
when considered in the light of the legal problems involved under the Supreme Court decision. The Respondents took no steps to determine the tax payable to then1.
The Respondents, on the other hand, have only interposed
one pleading and one action on its own accord since
the entry of the Supren1e Court decision, that being the
~Lotion to Dismiss filed after Appellant had again attempted some action. The Respondents, notwithstanding
their equal obligation to move ahead either in the preparation of the Findings and a final appealable judgment
or in the seeking of relief to determine the amount of
the reimbursable taxes, sat quietly by until Appellant
renewed its activity in the case. Only after the hearing
June 2, 1958, upon plaintiff's ~lotion (R. 2-!) did defendants take any action whatsoever. Respondents make
no clain1 that they have been prejudiced and can make
no such claim, notwithstanding son1e very strong language to the contrary c01npletely without foundation in their
Affidavit (R. 32, 34). Appellant has always attempted
to have the correct amount detennined and up to and
including the present tilne, and want the Court to determine the correct mnount, and not to 1nerely dis1niss the
action.
Notwithstanding this record, the Court now holds
that Appellant should have all of the property taken fr01n
it because it has done nothing to bring this law suit to
a final conclusion. This does not appear to be consistent
with the rreord and thus is an abuse of disrretion.
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Inasmuch as the only determination to be made by
the Trial Court involves the amount of money to be paid
the Respondents, it is only reasonable to assume that the
Respondents should have some interest in determining the
amount of taxes to be paid them. It is unrealistic to
argue that the Appellant had the only burden of 1noving
ahead.
As stated in Wright vs. Howe, 150 P. 956, 46 Utah
588:
"The defendants had the smne right to press the
action to trial that the plaintiff had, and if they
were willing to permit it to remain untried, and
especially in the absence of any showing of prejudice, they can not complain."
The mere lapse of time is not sufficient upon which to
justify a dismissal of the action for lack of prosecution.
In the case of Kuyich v. Lillie, 260 P. 2d 383 (Montana),
the Court, in denying dismissal for lack of prosecution,
stated:
"~Iere

lapse of time is not sufficient in itself to
justify dismissal of the actions, State Saving
Bank v. Albertson, 102 P. 692 (Montana) and Eldredge v. Idaho State Penitentiary, 30 P. 2d 781.
Defendant was privileged to notice his demurreri3
for hearing, but this he did not do, notwithstanding that he had the same right to place the
actions for trial as had the plaintiffs."

The Court also cites Wright v. Howe, supra.
In the case of Lyon vs. State, 283 P. 2d 1105 (Ida.)
an action was con1menced January 5, 1942 to quiet title
to real property. It was stricken from the calendar until
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October 2, 1953, when the defendant moved to reinstate
the cause and then moved to dismiss for lack of prosecution. The Supreme Court, in reversing the Trial Court's
dismissal, stated:
"Was the cause properly dismissed for lack of
prosecution~ It should be noted that Respondents
made the motion to have the cause revived and
placed on the calendar. Shortly thereafter, the
demurrer was argued and ruling made. There
was nothing asserted that would indicate that
Respondents had lost any rights or had been prejudiced in any manner hy the delay. The fact that
the prosecution of the action was delayed for a
considerable length of time would not in itself and
standing alone be conclusive of the matter and
Respondents would not be entitled to a sumn1ary
dismissal, over objection, where no prejudice ·was
asserted or shown or other sufficient reasons for
dismissal made to appear. There was nothing presented before the trial court that would indicate
that appellants had unreservedly abandoned the
action."
Again, in the case of Nielson vs. Old Charles Dickens
Minivng Company, 1 P. 2d 193 (Ida.). an action was
commenced March 17, 1924, and a l\Iotion to Dismiss was
filed in 1930, after various negotiations and dealings
were had and defendant had 1nade no objection to the
delay. In reversing the Lower Court's dismissal, the
Supreme Court stated:
"It will be noticed that the defendants, other
than Winigar, made no objection on the ground
of delay until the present attorneys for Appellant
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began to vigorously take steps for the disposition
of the issues in the case.
"Certainly it does not appear from the record
herein that Appellant abandoned or at any time
int~nded to abandon his action to enforce payment * * * * * and in view of the negotiations
and dealings transpiring, it would seem arbitrary
to dismiss the action."
An examination of the decision of our Supreme Court
indicates that a substantial period of time was contemplated before the matter might be finally decided. The
Court recognized that several years 1night pass before
the final tax liability could be determined. The Court
stated:
"Because it may be some time before the State
Tax Commission makes an assessment for those
years it ommitted to do so, if it ever makes an
assessment at all, the lower court should fashion
the relief granted to the parties to meet this
exigency. It would work an injustice on the plaintiff to delay entering a decree quieting title in it
until the Tax Commission acts."
Certainly from this language, it is apparent that
the Trial Court could adequately protect both parties'
interests over the years until the tax assessment problem
is settled. In view of this 1nandate it is difficult to see
how Respondent would in any way be prejudiced by a
determination by the Trial Court of the tax responsibility,
either at an earlier date or now. It is also apparent that
the Supreme Court anticipated a possible delay in final
disposition of the case. These factors further rule out
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any argument that the Supreme Court was concerned
with an immediate action in order to protect the parties'
interests.
It should also be noted that this is not a case where
nothing was done pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court. Rather, the record indicates that six months
after the entry of the Supreme Court decision on September 16, 1949, the plaintiff called the matter on for
hearing in compliance with said mandate. Any delay,
therefore, has not been a delay of the Appellant, but
rather a delay of the Respondents in not having entered
the final appealable order after that hearing. The order
was in favor of the Respondents and, therefore, it wa8
encu1nbent upon the Respondents to do what was necessary to bring the matter to a final judgment. The Respondents failed to do this and their failure cannot be
associated with the Appellant and used as a reason for
dis1nissing the action because of the failure to prosecute
said action.
The longest period of inactivity in this case was
frmn 1953 when the l\iotion to Dis1niss was filed by the
Appellant, to l\Iay, 1958, when plaintiff filed a l\Iotion
to Dis1niss for Lack of Prosecution, and for Decree
Quieting Title or a period of about five years. Only six
1nonths elapsed frmn the entry of the decision to the
filing of plantiff's l\Iotion in 1950. Three years elapsed
from that time to 1953 when plaintiff's l\Iotion to Dismiss was filed and five years elapsed frmn that date to
the present date. During all of these years, the defendants
took no affirnmtin~ action and left everything up to the
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plaintiff. The mere lapse of time is not sufficient grounds
for dismissal for lack of prosecution. Wright v. Howe,
supra.
Therefore, it would seem that the Respondents are
the parties who have failed to prosecute this action in any
\vay whatsoever. Can said Respondents now co1ne in and
clai1n that the Appellant has done nothing when as a
1natter of fact the Appellant on four different occasions
has attempted to obtain relief, but has been denied in its
efforts.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION THAT THE COURT HEAR EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DIRECTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT AND ENTER ITS WRITTEN
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH, DETERMINING
THE REMAINING ISSUES AND THE AMOUNT DUE TO
DEFENDANTS.

As has been fully discussed under Point I, Appellant
1s entitled to a hearing on the n1erits pursuant to the
Supreme Court Decision.
In addition thereto, Appellant is entitled to Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment based upon
the facts adduced at the hearing before Judge Baker
June 19, 1950.
Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
in part as follows:
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the Court shall,
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unless the same are waived, find the facts specially
and state separately its Conclusions of Law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate Judgment * * * * *"
Since Judge Baker is no longer District Judge and
cannot make the Findings and Conclusions, a new court
should hear the matter and enter the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment. This procedure has been denied
Appellant, resulting in a deviation from the above rule.
The same issues unsuccessfully placed before the Court
in 1950 could now be tried, and the fact that the property
n1ay have increased in value, as is claimed by Respondents, would have no effect other than a possible benefit
to the Respondents because of higher taxes and more
interest thereon.
Thus as a practical solution to the problem, as well
as one supported by the la,v·, Appellants are entitled
to a hearing to determine the extent of reimbursement
of taxes under the Supreme Court Decision.
POINT III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HEAR ARGUMENTS AND TO ENTER ITS WRITTEN FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DEoCREE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE WRITTEN MINUTE ENTRY HERETOFORE ENTERED BY JUDGE CLARENCE E. BAKER ON
JUNE 19, 1950.
POINT IV.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION THAT THE COURT ENTER WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LA\r AND
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DEoCREE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MINUTE ENTRY
OF JUDGE STEWART M. HANSEN HERETOFORE
ENTERED ON JUNE 2, 1958.

These points should be considered together and in
relation to Point II. As has been argued before, the Appellant is entitled to written Findings, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment from which an appeal can be taken.
Until such documents are signed and entered by the
Court, there is nothing from which Appellant can properly determine the basis for the Court's decision.
Appellant is entitled to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, otherwise cmnpliance with
the Rule and with the Supreme Court Decision is circumvented. Wasatch OiJl Refining Company vs. Wade,
92 Utah 50, 63 P. 2d 1070, Baird vs. Upper Canal Irrigation Company, 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060.
POINT V.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENTER AN
ORDER OR JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.

This point is fully discussed u:qder Point I above.
The Lower Court being direct~d to proceed pursuant to
the mandate of the Supreme Court, must upon application of Appellant afford the proper relief set forth by
the Supreme Court, or upon failing to do so, enter an
Order from which an appeal will lie. This procedure has
not been observed in this case and by reason thereof,
Appellant has been denied an appeal on the merits of
the issues existing between the parties.
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SUMMARY
Appellant obtained a Judgment which was in effect
affirmed, quieting title in it and against Respondents
to certan real property situate in Salt Lake County. Appellant, after the entry of the Supreme Court Decision,
has in a variety of ways, attempted to wind up the
matter according to said Decision. Respondents, on the
other hand, although apparently vitally interested in the
amount of reimbursement to which Respondents are
entitled, have done nothing to show their interest until
after the Appellants' final attempt to conclude the Inatter
in June, 1958. Certainly Appellant's actions, although
extending over several years, have indicated no abandonment of its position in the proceedings. There has merely
been a lapse of time between each of the actions atten1pterl
by Appellant. On the other hand, Respondents' failure to

act during

an~·

of the periods between

~lppellant's

acts,

indicate a waiver of any dissatisfaction concerning the
slowness of the proceeding. Were the Respondents really
concerned about this n1atter, they might have Inoved to
disn1iss between 1953 and 1958. However, they waited
until after the hearing in June, 1958, called on by the
Appellant, to pursue any nf otion to Dis1niss. Tllis action
of the Respondents should not be considered as any
indication that Respondents were dissatisfied with the
progress of the proceedings. This inaction of Respondents indicates an abandon1nent by the1n of any bona fide
claim of failure to prosecute the proceedings.
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The result of the ruling of this Lower Court is now
to divest the Appellant of the real property, contrary
to the Decision of the Trial Court hereinbefore entered
and contrary to the direction of the Supreme Court in
its decision. This inequity is forced on Appellant not·withstanding its bona fide efforts to bring the matter to
a close.
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant submits
that the action of the Trial Court in dismissing this
action and the Complaint herein is contrary to the law
and is further contrary to principles of equity. Said
decision should be reversed and the matter should be
remanded for trial upon the issues set forth in the Supreme Court Decision.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE & MECHAM

BY
Elliott Lee Pratt
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant

351 South State Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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